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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT P. MORRIS, and
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE,
INC.,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
Case No. 15660
vs.
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES,
INC.,
Defendant and
Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
The nature of the case and disposition in the lower
court are thoroughly discussed in Appellant's initial brief,
and will not be repeated here.

For convenience, references

to the Respondents' brief will be shown as (R's brief), and
the Transcript of Trial as (Tr.).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE "PROCURING CAUSE" STANDARD IS DIFFERENT FOR "BROKERS II THAN FOR "FINDERS I I .
There are no Utah cases recognizing recovery based upon
a claim
for a finder's fee, as opposed to a broker's fee.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Plaintiffs argue that "the distinction is quite narrow"
brief 9), and that the trial court's

instr~ction

(R' s

number 11

"properly defined the term 'procuring cause' whether Morris
is deemed to be a 'finder' or a 'broker'" (R's brief 9).
While recovery for either a broker or a finder requires the
test of procuring cause, there is a significant difference
in the type of performance required.
It should first be noted that nearly all of the cases
dealing with finders are set in the context of "business
opportunity finders", or in specialized fields such as
speculative oil and gas leases.

Finders are generally not

regulated or licensed by the states, while real estate
brokers are universally so regulated.
Plaintiffs cite several cases in their brief at pp. 9-10,
setting forth the standard for finders, none of which deal
with real estate sales or leasing transactions.

(Amerofina-

business merger opportunity; Minichiello-steck investment
opportunity; Bittner-business purchase opportunity; Freemanstock investment opportunity; Consolidated Oil-oil and gas
lease).

They argue that the standard for finders in those

cases requires only an introduction of the parties, and
setting "the chain of event in motion which results in the
sale".

(R's brief 10, citing Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.

v. Roberts, 425 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1967)).
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In direct contrast with the Consolidated Oil finder's
standard is the broker's standard, set forth in Midwest
Realty Co. v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 341 F.Supp. 1008
(E.D. Mo. 1972):
A broker is not entitled to recover a commission
if his acts were merely one of a chain of causes
producing a sale or contributing in some degree
thereto unless his acts constituted the efficient
and procuring cause thereof.
Id. at 1012-13.
The Consolidated Oil case itself points out the distinction between oil and gas finders and real estate brokers:
The custom and usage in the oil and gas industry
in regard to brokers and finders are spelled out
in great detail by this record. The usual type
of broker's commission case in the regulated real
estate business in Colorado, as is urged by the
defendant, is not necessar1ly 1n point here ••.•
The law is that the right of a broker to recover
a commission is dependent upon the terms of the
agreement and the performance expected of him.
(Citations omitted).
The measure of performance
of an oil and gas broker or finder would seem to
require only that he present a property available
for acquisition and then procure any requested
information needed to evaluate the property. His
compensation is dependent upon the subsequent
purchase, but not upon his efforts toward accomplishing the purchase.
425 P.2d at 286-87.
(Emphasis added).
Thus, the standard for a real estate broker requires
more than just setting the chain of events in motion.

As

stated in Reed v. Taylor, 322 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1958):
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The mere introduction of a prospect to an owner,
or even the broker's participation in unsuccessful negotiations between the parties Joes not
earn the broker a commission.
In such a
case the introduction of a prospect is merely
one step in providing the foundation from which
the broker may develop a sale. Id. at 150.
The Utah case of Brooks v. Geo. Q. Cannon Assn., 53 Utah
304, 178 P. 589 (1919), discussed at length in Appellant's
initial brief, may have come closer to a fact situation appropriate for a finder's standard, as it involved a loan broker
rather than a real estate broker.

Nevertheless, the Utah

court stated that the procuring cause standard required the
broker to be the "efficient procuring or producing cause of
the transaction relied upon by him".

The efforts of the

broker in Brooks, while quite similar to those of the
plaintiff Morris, were held insufficient to entitle him
to a commission.
Plaintiffs erroneously cite the Utah case of Frederick
May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 ( 1962), for
the proposition that "The agent need only 'bring to the
attention of the buyer that the property is for sale'" (R's
brief 14).

Actually, the Frederick May case held that the

broker had not met the procuring cause standard, and that a
directed verdict for the seller against the broker seeking a
commission was proper.

Although the purchaser (S&H) became

aware of the subject property through the broker (May),
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"[a]ll of the negotiations between them were on the basis
that S&H was only a prospective financial backer of another
person who was interested in making the purchase".
at 269.

368 P.2d

Thus, plaintiffs' reliance on the "bring to the

attention of the buyer" language is misplaced, and more is
required to meet the procuring cause requirement in Utah.
Illustrative of the distinction between finders and
brokers is the case of Bittner v. American-Marietta Co., 162
F.Supp. 486 (E.D.Ill. 1958).

Plaintiffs rely on this case

for the proposition that "[a]ll the 'finder' is required to
do is bring the seller to the attention of the purchaser".
(R's brief 10).

Plaintiffs neglect to include language from

the same page of that decision which points out the distinction between finders and brokers:
A mere "finder" would not constitute a broker.
There is no reliance upon the "finder" to perform
the duties of the broker in negotiating the contract.
In New York the distinction between a "finder"
and a "broker" has been recognized.
In Kuffler
v. List, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 144 F.Supp. 776, 778, the
court held that there was a "difference between
finding a business for others to do and acting as
a broker in doing the business".
162 F.Supp. at
488.
(Emphasis added).
In Utah, to be a procuring cause required more than
being a finder in the business opportunity sense--more than
"setting the chain of events in motion".

It requires being
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the cause of a meeting of the minds--being the efficient
procuring cause of the transaction.
POINT II
INSTRUCTION 11 STATES THE STANDARD FOR A
FINDER, NOT A BROKER.
As discussed above, while a finder's test of procuring
cause may be satisfied by less, a broker must be more than
"merely one of a chain of causes".

Midwest Realty, supra.

Further, "the negotiations conducted by the broker must have
progressed to a point where success seems imminent".

Hampton

Park Corp. v. T. D. Burgess Co., Inc., 311 A.2d 35, 42 (Md.
1973).

This case goes on to state:

In the final analysis, the broker must establish
that he is the primary, proximate and procuring
cause of the sale, (citation omitted); and it is
not sufficient that the broker has merely "pranted
the seed from which the harvest was reaped".
(Emphasls added).
311 A. 2d at 42.
Plaintiffs admit in their "Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial" that "instruction
11 correctly states the law of procuring cause as it applies
to finders".

(Memorandum at 6).

Plaintiffs now contend

that instruction 11 "properly defined the term 'procuring
cause' whether Morris is deemed to be a 'finder' or a
'broker'".

(R's brief 9).

However,

in light of the above

discussion regarding the distinction between the procuring
cause standard of brokers and finders,

it is clear that the
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language of instruction 11

("plaintiffs must have set a

chain of events in motion that finally resulted in the
lease.

(T]his does not mean that plaintiffs must have

participated at every step of negotiations or even in most
of them," etc.) is, as plaintiffs originally contended, the
standard for finders.

It conveys the clear impression that

plaintiff need only start the ball rolling, i.e., introduce
the parties, and do nothing further.
To uphold such a finder's standard in the instant case
would be devastating precedent.

If a real estate broker

could recover for "only two phone calls" (R's brief 10), in
a fact setting such as the instant one, no one would dare
talk with such a person.

Every introduction or suggestion

by a broker could bind a seller to a commission.

As in the

instant case, the broker could sit back while doing nothing
for 18 months or more, and then claim a commission for the
earlier introduction.
Pass v. Industrial Asphalt of Cal., Inc., 239 Cal.App.2d
776, 49 Cal.R. 190 (1966)

involved a claimed finder's fee

for introducing the seller of a business to a prospective
purchaser who later purchased a different business from the
same seller.

Therein, the court reversed a judgment for the

finder, stating:
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A contrary rule which would allow a finder or
broker to obtain a commission for a cransaction
foreign to the purposes of his employment, and
with which he had no connection, would be absurd.
One would scarcely dare to employ a finder for a
particular purpose if the employment permitted the
finder to sit back, do nothing, and claim a fee
for transactions completely outside the purposes
of his employment.
49 Cal.R. at 195.
This is exactly the reason for the procuring cause test
for real estate brokers, and instruction 11 was a prejudicially inaccurate statement of the Utah requirement.
POINT III
THE LETTER AUTHORIZING A 6% COMMISSION
CONTEMPLATED AS CONSIDERATION THAT PLAINTIFFS PERFORM THE SERVICES OF A BROKER.
To have earned the 6% commission, plaintiffs must have
performed the duties contemplated under the contract.

As

the Utah Supreme Court stated in Frederick May, suera:
[T]he extent to which the broker's efforts must
induce the sale depends on the terms used in the
contract and the understanding and intention of
the parties in making such agreement and the facts
and circumstances of the case.
(Emphasis added)
368 P.2d at 269.
The commission recited, 6%, is the standard commission
paid to a real estate broker for his services as a broker.
As Victor Ayers, Morris' employer, testified (Tr.

43-44):

Q.

Did you see that letter when--while Mr. Morris
was still employed with you?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did you discuss the letter with Mr. Morris?
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A.

Well, I had discussed with Mr. Morris prior
to his getting that letter that that's the
kind of protection he should obta1n in working on a project such as that because it was
not listed at the time with any broker.

Plaintiff Morris testifed that he told John Price that
he:
Thought I had a good crack at a tenant that I had
been working with over a period of time, a major
tenant and was going to Los Angeles to see them,
would like to take a set of plans and would he
give me a letter assuring me of a commission if I
did so.
He said,

"Yes, come on down".

(Tr.

19).

There is nothing from that testimony, or any other,
which would infer that he was to only be a finder, and not a
broker.

To the contrary, Mr. Ayers testimony, above, gives

the impression that such was the normal type of listing agreement for a broker to obtain in working on such a project.
In Frederick May, supra, the Utah cvurt stated:
It is generally recognized that a broker's authority to sell property is not exclusive and does not
require the payment of the commission to the
broker upon a sale not procured by him, unless
made so by the contract of employment in clear and
unequivocal terms or by necessary implication.
This brokerage contract is what is called a
general listing agreement which leaves the owner
free to sell the property himself as long as he
does so in good faith.
Under such contracts a
broker must be the procuring cause in order to be
entitled to a commission for such sale.
(Emphasis
added).
368 P.2d at 268-69.
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Mr. Machan, who negotiated the IBM lease for the Price
organization, testified that plaintiffs did "absolutely
nothing" that resulted in the procuring of the lease by the
Price organization (Tr. 67), and the testimony of IBM's
personnel was to the same effect.
John Price, president of defendant, testified:
I gave him parameters of the rent.
I told him to
bring the tenant in and that he would be -- have
to be in the negotiations and put this deal
together. That was my exact conversation at the
very, very beginning.
I didn't agree to have any
other relationship with Rob.
He had to come in
and put it together because I have a staff that
can do that so if he's going to earn a commission,
he has a tenant he's got to come in and do the
work.
(Tr. 96).
Against that factual background, with no evidence to
the contrary, plaintiffs assert that they were only required
to introduce the parties, let the deal sit for 18 months,
let IBM and Price do all the work, and then collect $22,000.00
as a full 6% broker's commission for acting as a finder.
That contention is unsupported in the evidence or in the
law.
As stated above, the extent of the required performance
must be implied to support the otherwise silent written
contract.

This implied additional term would constitute an

implied-in-fact agreement, as defined recently by the Utah
Supreme Court in Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205

(Utah 1976).
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Fowler coincidentally dealt with a real estate salesperson/
broker.

The court held that there was no implied-in-fact

agreement as to the broker's commission because, as in tne
instant case, there was no mutual assent indicating an
intent to be bound to a contract with certain terms:
Defendant contends there is no evidence to sustain
a finding there was an implied-in-fact contract.
With this contention we must agree, for there was
no evidence of any action or conduct that reasonably could be construed as a manifestation of
mutual assent 1nd1cat1ng an 1ntention to be bound
on a contract whose terms were certain.
The
terms of the alleged agreement are unknown, vi~
the duties, conditions, and compensation.
Defendant believed the use of plaintiff's license was
gratuitous; plaintiff expected to receive the
entire fruits of defendant's contract.
Their
conduct cannot be construed as a manifestation of
mutual assent to a contract whose terms are
certain.
(Emphasis added).
Id. at 208-09.
Similarly, in the instant case the performance requirement of the agreement was silent.

Thus, the court should

have instructed the jury clearly on the applicable aspects
of contract law and the terms which must be implied-in-fact

in order to establish a binding agreement.

There was no

such instruction.
Further, the court refused to give defendant's proposed
special verdict, over defendant's objection "that the general
verdict allows the Jury to speculate on matters of contract
law regarding which they were not instructed and allows them
to imply elements into the contract arrangement which may or

may not have existed".

(Tr.

116).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

There was no evidence that less performance was required
or anticipated than that of a broker to earn the standard 6%
commission.

The fact that the commission was the standard

6% itself infers that the performance required must be that
of a broker.

Yet, the instruction given by the court set

out the standard for a finder, a lower standard of performance than contemplated by the parties, and none not supported
by Utah law in the absence of a clear and unambiguous
contract to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the lower
court should be reversed.

~
~---day of December,

Respectfully submitted this

1978.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

~P~a7u~l~~~D~r-o~z~--~~--~~-----

Attorneys for Appellant
John Price Associates, Inc.
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